by The PyTorch Team

If you installed PyTorch-nightly on Linux via pip between December 25, 2022 and December 30, 2022, please uninstall it and torchtriton immediately, and use the latest nightly binaries (newer than Dec 30th 2022).

$ pip3 uninstall -y torch torchvision torchaudio torchtriton
$ pip3 cache purge

PyTorch-nightly Linux packages installed via pip during that time installed a dependency, torchtriton, which was compromised on the Python Package Index (PyPI) code repository and ran a malicious binary. This is what is known as a supply chain attack and directly affects dependencies for packages that are hosted on public package indices.

NOTE: Users of the PyTorch stable packages are not affected by this issue.

How to check if your Python environment is affected

The following command searches for the malicious binary in the torchtriton package (PYTHON_SITE_PACKAGES/triton/runtime/triton) and prints out whether your current Python environment is affected or not.

python3 -c "import pathlib;import importlib.util;s=importlib.util.find_spec('triton'); affected=any( == 'triton' for x in (pathlib.Path(s.submodule_search_locations[0] if s is not None else '/' ) / 'runtime').glob('*'));print('You are {}affected'.format('' if affected else 'not '))"

The malicious binary is executed when the triton package is imported, which requires explicit code to do and is not PyTorch’s default behavior.

The Background

At around 4:40pm GMT on December 30 (Friday), we learned about a malicious dependency package (torchtriton) that was uploaded to the Python Package Index (PyPI) code repository with the same package name as the one we ship on the PyTorch nightly package index. Since the PyPI index takes precedence, this malicious package was being installed instead of the version from our official repository. This design enables somebody to register a package by the same name as one that exists in a third party index, and pip will install their version by default.

This malicious package has the same name torchtriton but added in code that uploads sensitive data from the machine.

What we know

torchtriton on PyPI contains a malicious triton binary which is installed at PYTHON_SITE_PACKAGES/triton/runtime/triton. Its SHA256 hash is listed below.

SHA256(triton)= 2385b29489cd9e35f92c072780f903ae2e517ed422eae67246ae50a5cc738a0e

The binary’s main function does the following:

  • Get system information
    • nameservers from /etc/resolv.conf
    • hostname from gethostname()
    • current username from getlogin()
    • current working directory name from getcwd()
    • environment variables
  • Read the following files
    • /etc/hosts
    • /etc/passwd
    • The first 1,000 files in $HOME/*
    • $HOME/.gitconfig
    • $HOME/.ssh/*
  • Upload all of this information, including file contents, via encrypted DNS queries to the domain *.h4ck[.]cfd, using the DNS server wheezy[.]io

The binary’s file upload functionality is limited to files less than 99,999 bytes in size. It also uploads only the first 1,000 files in $HOME (but all files < 99,999 bytes in the .ssh directory).

Steps taken towards mitigation

  • torchtriton has been removed as a dependency for our nightly packages and replaced with pytorch-triton (pytorch/pytorch#91539) and a dummy package registered on PyPI (so that this issue doesn’t repeat)
  • All nightly packages that depend on torchtriton have been removed from our package indices at until further notice
  • We have reached out to the PyPI security team to get proper ownership of the torchtriton package on PyPI and to delete the malicious version